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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v- Case No. 15432 
KARL J. STAVAR, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The presentation of these sections made by appellant 
are satisfactory. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the trial court decision 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Except as noted below, the presentation of facts 
made by appellant is satisfactory. 
Appellant states that the motion to dismiss was 
granted without prejudice by the trial court. The transcript 
of the proceedings does not state this. On page 11 of the 
transcript the judge merely stated that "I dismiss the accu-
sation." 
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ARGUMEUT 
POINT I 
THE STATE HAS NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR 
APPEAL SINCE UTAH CODE ANN. § 77 - 7 -1 
( 19 5 3) , AS AMENDED , IS CRIMINAL IN 
SUBSTANCE, AND THE STATE CAN ONLY APPEAL 
FROM CRIMINAL ACTIONS WHEN ALLOWED TO BY 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-39-4 (1953). 
The procedure followed when pursuing an action under 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 (1953), as amended, is set out in 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2, et seq. The title of Title 77 is 
Code of Criminal Procedure. Although the exact characteriza-
tion to be given to the term "malfeasance in office" is one of 
the issues of this brief, there is no doubt that the procedures 
used when bringing an action under Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 
(1953), as amended (hereinafter 77-7-1), are those allowed for 
criminal actions, even when pursuing a charge of "malfeasance 
in office." 
The grounds for appeal available to the state in a 
criminal proceeding are limited by Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4 
(1953) (hereinafter 77-39-4) which states: 
An appeal may be taken by the state: 
(1) From a judgment of dismissal 
in favor of the defendant upon a 
motion to quash the information or 
indictment. 
(2) From an order arresting judg-
ment. 
(3) From an order made after judg-
ment affecting the substantial 
rights of the state. 
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(4) From an order of the court 
directing the jury to find for 
the defendant. 
Therefore, the issues to be confronted are: (1) does an action 
brought for malfeasance in office fall within the limitations 
imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4 (1953), and, if so, (2) 
in this particular case, is the state prohibited from appeal-
ing the lower court ruling. 
Appeals from actions brought under 77-7-1, as 
amended, should be limited by 77-39-4 on the basis of a logi-
cal construction of the statutes, since both fall under the 
same title. To interpret 77-7-1 as falling outside of the 
limitation of 77-39-4 would result in allowing an action 
falling within criminal procedure guidelines not to be covered 
by its express limitations. 
An action does not need to be "wholly criminal" in 
application to fall under 77-39-4. In Hartman v. Weggeland, 
19 Utah 2d 229, 429 P.2d 978 (1967), an appeal by a county 
attorney and city judge from an order that certain depositions 
be made avialable to the defendant in a criminal case, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It might be argued that because the 
state is not a named party this 
matter is civil in nature, and hence 
the quoted section (77-39-1] does 
not apply. However, the veneer is 
civil. The substance is criminal. 
(~mphasis added.) 
The court went on to hold that the 77-39-4 limitations 
-3-
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applied, and that appeal was barred. 
Although no Utah "malfeasance" cases have directly 
ruled on this point, all of the cases have emphsized the need 
for protection of the defendant in this type of action and 
have demonstrated that an action brought for malfeasance in 
office is criminal in substance. In State v. Geurts, 11 Utah1c 
345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961), the court stated: 
. . due to the serious conse-
quences to a defendant so charged 
[with malfeasance in office] , it 
is also important to maintain such 
protections for the accused as can 
be done consistent with the pur-
pose of the statute. 
In State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190, 407 P.2d 571 (1965), the 
court reinforced the protection due a defendant in a malfea-
sance in office action: 
. . . the statute should be 
strictly construed against the 
authorit! invoking it and liber-
ally in avor of the one against 
whom it is asserted. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Later in the opinion, the court stated: 
. . . the privilege of choosing 
and electing public officials 
and repudiating them if and when 
they so desire, belongs exclu-
sively to the people, and that 
neither the courts nor any other 
authority should be hasty to 
encroach upon that right. 
It is clear that as a result of the express holding 
in Hartman extending 77-39-4 to matters that are criminal in 
-4-
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substance, and the tenor of Geurts and Jones concerning the 
protection due to one charged with malfeasance in office, the 
limitations of 77-39-4 should be applied to action brought 
under 77-7-1, a sister chapter in the same title. To rule 
otherwise would allow the State to proceed with all of the 
effect and force of a criminal proceeding without any of the 
statutory restraints. 
Since 77-39-4 should be applied to actions brought 
under 77-7-1, the question becomes whether or not in this 
particular case 77-39-4 bars an appeal by the State. The 
State in this case proceeded against the defendant on the 
basis of an accusation, as provided for in 77-7-2. It must 
be noted that the term "accusation" was present in the 1953 
version of 77-7-1, the same time 77-39-4 was enacted without 
mentioning an "accusation." 
Section 77-39-4 expressly authorizes certain appeals 
by the State, thus disallowing any grounds for appeal not 
stated therein. The term "accusation" is not found in any 
part of 77-39-4. Therefore, appeal from a dismissal of an 
accusation is prohibited. It might be argued that the appeal 
is civil in nature; however, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
do not have any provision relating to appeal from a dismissal 
of an accusation. By omitting the term "accusation" from any 
of the bases available for appeal, it must be presumed that 
the legislature did not intend to permit an appeal to be 
-5-
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taken by the State when the court quashes an accusation. 
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted 77-39-4 very 
strictly. In State v. Overson, 26 Utah 2d 313, 489 P.2d 110 
(1971), the State appealed from an order granting defendant's 
motion to dismiss on the grounds of trial court error. The 
court held that this basis for appeal did not 
fall within any [basis for 
appeal] of the highlz restrictive 
statute, Sec. 77-39- , U.C.A. 
1953, specifying the instances in 
which the state may appeal. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This same reasoning was used in dismissing an appeal in State 
v. Callahan, 26 Utah 2d 304, 488 P.2d 1048 (1971). 
If an appeal by the State in a matter that is 
criminal in nature is not expressly allowed under 77-39-4, it 
is barred. Since actions brought under 77-7-1 should fall 
under the restrictions provided for in that chapter, appeal 
by the State from the dismissal of an accusation should fall 
within 77-39-4. In this case, the State has no statutory 
grounds for appeal. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
THERE MUST BE A CONVICTION PRIOR TO 
PROCEEDING UNDER 77-7-1 AND 77-7-2. 
The logical reading of 77-7-1 demonstrated that a 
conviction of (1) a felony, or (2) an indictable misdemeanor, 
or (3) a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, or (4) of 
-6-
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malfeasance in office is necessary in order to remove persons 
from office. This requirement of a conviction can be shown 
by the legislative intent, the case law, the construction of 
the statute, and the alternatives available to a party 
attempting to remove a public official from office. 
A long line of Utah cases states that the primary 
rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry into 
effect the intention of the legislature. Taft v. Glade, 201 
P.2d 285 (Utah 1948); Rogers v. Wagstaff, 120 Utah 136, 232 
P.2d 766 (1951). In Johnson v. State Tax Cormnission, 17 
Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 (1966), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
The fundamental consideration 
which transcends all others in 
regard to the interpretation 
and application of a statute 
is: What was the intent of the 
legislature? All other rules 
of statutory construction are 
subordinate to it and are help-
ful only insofar as they assist 
in attainin~ that objective. 
(Emphasis a ded.) 
The history behind the enactment of the present 
77-7-1 is helpful in determining the intent of the legis-
lature. Prior to 1967, 77-7-1 read: 
All officers not liable to im-
peachment shall be subject to 
removal for high crimes, mis-
demeanors or malfeasance in 
off ice as in this chapter pro-
vided. 
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The word "conviction" did not appear anywhere in the statute; 
rather, the statute seemed to require misdoing "in office" 
for removal, leaving an official who committed crimes outside 
of office immune from removal. The Utah Supreme Court inter-
preted the statute in this manner in State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 
190, 407 P.2d 571 (1965), resulting in a county auditor serving 
time in jail for failure to file an income tax return while 
holding on to his county position. 
As a result of the Jones decision, Representative 
Frost of the Utah State Legislature sponsored an amendment to 
77-7-1. On February 2, 1967, debate concerning House Bill 82 
(amending 77-7-1) took place. (See attached exhibit.) The 
following excerpts from the debate clearly demonstrate that a 
conviction for any of the offenses listed in 77-7-1 is neces-
sary in order to remove an official from office. 
REPRESENTATIVE FROST: ... I 
would like to give you just a 
little bit of background on this 
bill. It came about through 
the incident here in Salt Lake 
County of Mr. Jones being con-
victed and being sent to prison 
while in office, and so I decided 
that probably there was something 
that needed to be done about the 
bill. . .. the law should be 
clarified and strengthened . . . 
that it was very definite and 
clear how he [a person who per-
formed misconduct in office] could 
be removed from office. 
REPRESENTATIVE COX: Such accusa-
tion may be initiated by any 
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taxpayer. Now I am wondering 
about that, does that mean that 
the bum that has bought a pack 
of cigarettes downtown and is 
arrested by the sheriff and 
taken to the jail because he 
was inebriated or was a vagrant, 
that he could come out of jail 
day after tomorrow and by making 
a sworn statement make that 
sheriff defend himself before 
the District Court, is that the 
meaning of this. 
REPRESENTATIVE FROST: ... we 
did not make this harsh enough 
so that any little picky accusa-
tions like that they could com-
mence accusation for removal. 
They have to be convicted of a 
felony to begin with. . . . one 
thing that we wanted to get away 
from . . that some crank could 
not start procedures without any 
basis for this procedure. . 
this spells out very clearly that 
before anything definitely can be 
taken care of or proceedings be 
started that he would have to be 
. . . shown beyond any reasonable 
doubt that he was ~uilty of some 
of these crimes.Emphasis added.) 
The sponsor of the bill emphasized that conviction of a crime 
was a prerequisite to initiating action under 77-7-1. 
The State wants 77-7-1 interpreted so that it would 
read: " . shall be subject to removal . . upon malfea-
sance in office or upon being convicted of a felony, an in-
dictable misdemeanor, or a misdemeanor involving moral turpi-
tude." Not only is this construction illogical and a direct 
contradiction of the legislative intent, it also is contrary 
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to Utah case law. In Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333 
P.2d 943 (1959), the Utah Supreme Court confronted the prob-
lem of interpreting a series of words in which the only con-
nective is the word "or." The court ruled that the disjunctive 
"or" applies to the entire series of words, in that case 
interpreting "consent to a chemical test of 
. his breath, 
blood, urine or saliva" to mean "consent to a chemical test 
. of breath or blood or urine or saliva." Applying this 
ruling to the present case, the only logical construction of 
77-7-1 is that it requires conviction of a felony, or an in-
dictable misdemeanor, ~a misdemeanor involving moral turpi-
tude or malfeasance in office. Just as the word "consent" 
applied to each individual type of test in Ringwood, the word 
"convicted" applies individually to each type of offense in 
77-7-1. 
It might be argued that requiring a conviction for 
77-7-1 limits taxpayer and grand jury rights under 77-7-2 and 
77-7-4, which allow them to bring accusations against public 
officials. However, as can be ascertained from the excerpts 
of the debate on House Bill 82, the legislature wanted to 
control the manner in which taxpayers could attempt to oust 
public officials. It would be chaotic to allow taxpayers to 
bring removal proceedings without some form of check on their 
action, such as a requirement of a prior conviction. As the 
statute now reads, if a public official is convicted of one of 
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the listed offenses under 77-7-1, a taxpayer is allowed to 
initiate action for removal under 77-7-2. This is a check 
upon public enforcement agencies. Should they decide not to 
proceed against a convicted official for political or other 
reasons, the taxpayer and/or grand jury are not left without 
recourse. 
Since a conviction is required under 77-7-1 to 
remove a public official, this creates two problems: (1) the 
term "malfeasance in office" is rendered inoperative since it 
is not codified, and one cannot be convicted of an uncodified 
crime, and (2) determining what recourse is available to re-
move a dishonest official in order to protect the public. 
The argument that the term "malfeasance in office" 
is rendered invalid if a conviction is required is not con-
trolling. Section 77-7-1 also lists as grounds for removal 
"an indictable misdemeanor," and under the present Utah 
Criminal Code "an indictable misdemeanor" does not exist. 
This merely illustrates that the Utah State Legislature did 
not take into consideration all facets of the existing law 
when the new criminal code was enacted in 1973. This alone 
is not enough to justify distortion of a statute so as to 
render all parts totally operable. 
The new code does provide for an action that can 
be brought against public officials who are derelict in their 
duty. Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-201 provides: 
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A public servant is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor if with an 
intent to benefit himself or 
another or harm another, he 
knowingly commits an authorized 
act which purports to be an act 
of his office, or knowingly 
refrains from performing a duty 
imposed on him by law or clearly 
inherent in the nature of his 
office. 
Thus, the legislature has provided for an action with which 
a public official, if convicted, could fall within the removal 
section of 77-7-1, even if the term "malfeasance in office" 
is determined inoperative. 
Respondent therefore submits that the following 
would be consistent with the legislative intent and statutory 
construction: 
1. That conviction of one of the 
listed offenses is required to proceed 
for removal under 77-7-1. 
2. That a taxpayer or grand jury 
can bring an action to remove an elected 
official under 77-7-1 as a check on 
prosecuting officials who fail to act if 
the official has been convicted of one 
of the listed offenses. 
3. That other statutes, particu-
larly 76-8-201, provide adequate guide-
lines to proceed against official mis-
conduct, even if "malfeasance in office" 
is no longer an effective grounds for 
removal. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
THE ACCUSATION FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE 
OF ACTIOU. 
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The accusation in the present case was brought 
against the respondent for "connnitting malfeasance in office, 
in that during his term as chief of police said defendant 
did intentionally and knowingly breach the trust imposed on 
him " The issues are: (1) is malfeasance in office 
a viable means of "accusing" a public official, and (2) even 
if it is, was the accusation sufficient to bring such a 
charge. 
Since 77-7-1 requires a party to be "convicted" of 
the listed offenses in order to be removed from office, and 
there is no crime of "malfeasance" for which an official can 
be convicted, accusing a party of malfeasance is not a viable 
means for initiating removal from office. "Malfeasance in 
office" was characterized in the Geurts case as being "quasi-
criminal," therefore, most standards for criminal proceedings 
were applied to charges of malfeasance in office at the time. 
Since then, 77-7-1 has been amended to require a conviction 
for removal of office, thus characterizing "malfeasance in 
office" as a crime. However, malfeasance in office is not 
codified, and in 1973, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 was enacted, 
which states: 
Connnon law crimes are abolished 
and no conduct is a crime unless 
made so by this code, other 
applicable statute or ordinance. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Therefore, under present statutory guidelines, an action for 
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malfeasance in office cannot be prosecuted. This does not 
leave the State without recourse against dishonest officials, 
as was demonstrated in Point II of this brief. 
Even if malfeasance in office is held not to fall 
completely within criminal procedure guidelines, the accusa-
tion in this case fails for lack of sufficiency as shown in 
Burke v. Knox, 59 Utah 596, 206 P. 711 (1922). In Burke, a 
case in which a Utah official was accused under a statute 
identical to 77-7-1 before it was amended in 1967, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
The pleader must state in ordi-
nary and concise language the 
particular acts or things done 
by the accused which constitute 
the offense he is charged with 
having cormnitted. 
The court later stated: 
Until (the actual thing or act 
complained of . . . is fully 
set forth and pointed out in the 
accusation) the accusation must 
be held insufficient for want of 
facts . . . . 
The court also stated that mere conclusions of law were not 
enough to maintain such an action; explicit facts detailing 
the accusation were required. 
Forty years later, the Utah Supreme Court again 
confronted the specificity requirement of the term "malfeasance 
in office" in Geurts. Although the court held that the term 
was not so vague as to be unconstitutional, the court defined 
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--
"malfeasance in office" as: 
(requiring) an intentional 
act or omission relating to the 
duties of a public office, which 
amounts to a crime, or which in-
volves a substantial breach of 
trust imposed on the official by 
the nature of his office, and 
which conduct is of such charac-
ter as to offend against the 
commonly accepted standard of 
honesty and morality. 
In Geurts, the indictment stated with specificity the acts 
which constituted the offense of which the official was 
charged. 
The result of the holdings in Burke and Geurts is 
that specific acts are necessary to proceed against an indi-
vidual charged with malfeasance in office, and that these 
acts must be specified in the accusation. In the case at 
hand, the accusation fails to meet these standards. 
The accusation against the respondent merely states 
that he has committed malfeasance in office, a legal conclu-
sion, and that he "did intentionally and knowingly break the 
trust imposed on him by virtue of his office to a substantial 
degree and in such a way as to offend against the commonly 
accepted standards of a person in his office," a legal conclu-
sion worded within the Geurts definition. However, Geurts 
does not state that the acts constituting the offense need 
not be specified. In Geurts the acts were specified and 
therefore not at issue. 
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Burke has not been overruled. The specificity re-
quirements of that case still control. The accusation against 
the respondent does not specify the acts with which the resp~­
dent has been charged, therefore the decision of the trial 
court that the accusation fails for want of sufficiency should 
stand. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court decision dismissing the accusation 
against respondent should be upheld for three reasons: 
1. The State has no basis for 
appeal under Title 77, the title 
under which this action was brought. 
2. As shown by the legislative 
intent and the construction of 77-7-1, 
a conviction is necessary prior to in-
stigating a removal action under that 
section. 
3. The accusation was insuffi-
cient to state a cause of action under 
the Burke-Geurts guidelines. 
To hold otherwise would result in a direct repudia-
tion of the legislative record, while at the same time creating 
a queasy quasi-criminal action that would allow a prosecuting 
official or taxpayer the complete advantages of criminal pro-
cess without any of the criminal process restraints. 
~sp~fully submitted, 
I 
1Phil L. Hansen 1 HANSEN AND HANSEN 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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Utah 84114, this~~~~~'~~-day of January, 1978. 
/ . 
#),zHk 
-17-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Exhibit 
llOUSE Ull.L .'Hl. I\.' !\ /·. 'I I) \' . \ l 1: I~ I l "1 l ) 1 · I ) ( . I l'L ~.I. T ( O 1-1· l Cl A I. 
llY: Frn~l. vr .11 
TO A~!END SECTI1lNS .CONCl.l{Nl.'iC Kb:M(..VAI. 111· i'l'kl [' 11FFfCF.RS TO PROVIDE 
SUCH REMllV,\L lll'(lN CllC.:\' ICTTO'l ilF FELONY, JNIJJ1, \Ill r: 'lISDEMEANOR OR 
ONE IN\'OLVINC .'10/UL TURPITUDE; PROVTTll·. J~ifTI,\l'T11N THROUGH PRESENTAT!Ot; 
o~· Sl./ORN ACCUS,\TJ1lN IN ll!STH!CT COlli<T II\' ,\NY T.\''.l'i\YF.R 
Read Flrst Time .S. Intrciduccd 
referred to Rules Committee 
J a 11 ll ;1 r y I 8 , I <i h 7 
RULES COM~ITTEE REPORT 
then referred co: 
J<.1nuary 20, 1977 
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS 
STANDINC C0~!~11TTEI·: Kl-:l'llR.1' I ,J 11 LJ :1 r \ 2 7 , I (1 t) 7 
COPY: D :1 t l~ J J .J nu ;1 r \ 2 7 
~1r. Speak.:r: 
D-10 
I) - 1 2 
[) - l g 
1g77 
p ·8 ~ 
a 
P-1 
Your Committe.: on Po l i t i c ;1 1 S 11 h d l v i •; i o 11 •; , t u ""I 1 i c Ii w a ~ re furred 
II • B. No . 8 2 , by Mr . 
carefully consld.:red 
Fr u s t ' L' t il l . ' R I'.'!\)\' ,\ I. r H n :1 () FF T r:: F ' h .J s 
s :1 i d h i I l n n J r '· p o r t c: t Ii 1: s G m e o u t f a v o r a b l \' . 
HOSS H. PLAST. Chairman 
Report filed. 
READ SECllND TIMI: .J.111u.Jry 27, l'lh/ lJ-1 9 
Read Third Time Februarv 2, 1967 D-25 
Committee Report Adopted 
RETAINED POSITION ON JRD REi\lllNC 
FllRT!IER CONSIDER,\TIUN fill 1!K..': F L i• r 11 .1 r v 3 , 1 9 6 7 D-26 





82 then pa SS<'~ __ Q_n_ t lie _fo Llyw_i ni; r o I l call: 
NAYS: 0 ABSENT: 5 
V 0 TING IN THE AFFIRM AT I~£.___\:! i :HE_: R" p rt' s "n ta t i '"" s \a g a rd , An cl oc rs on , 
C. T.; Anderson, R. C.; Arbu,·kle, Bagley, Rcl11111in, Jlenson, Bittner, 
Br ad y , Bronson , Bro u g Ii , Buh 1.: r , C :in 11 n n , C c1 r l i 11 1; , C ii r i s tense n , Cox , 
P-> 
D G y , Denn i s , Dr a k e , Es k l' l s <~ n , r i s 11 e r , F" w 1 e r , I' r o s t , \. i 1 1 man , Ha 11 ad a'" 
11 n l verso n , Hard in g , Ha r w ;1 rd , H i 1 l • I~ n d g k i n son • fl" l t , II u n t e r , Ink l e v, 
Jack, Jones, Kn0wlt<l11, l.e.1tli;11n, Lin 1::ir.I, l.ovt·ri.lge, Ludwig, ~Lither, 
M0cham, Mitcl1Qll, Obcr,;l1.1.s1L·v. l'L'tl'r .\•11, Pl:1nt. f'<1\vcl l, Prcl)C1·, R~JJ, 
R~ese, Regis, Russell, S:111der~. S:1\.'.l/,l' ~mitli • ...;td!lL', Sumsivn, 
r 11 u rs con , \J h £·el L' r , \\I ii t i :i 1; • W i 1 k i 11 .., , n • \J i l 1 i :1 r· - You 11 g , and Mr . Sr"" k 
ABS ENT AND N11T \'llT I N1:: Rl·:1rt'SL'nl.1(1\'l''-. IL1r.1·1..·r. \:l'l.L,on, ~iclsllD, P.1L 1 
,, r I 1 ''Ii r l' ~ • 
Tr:1nsmitted to Senatt· f,,,. its .1cti,>1: 
~- l t, r 11 ,1 r " 3 . ! \if 1 7 IJ - 2 h 
-18-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
February 2, 1967 
EXHIBIT 
HOUSE BILL No. 82. REMOVAL FROM OFFICE-PUBLIC OFFICIAL 
BY: Frost, et al. 
TO AMEND SECTIONS CONCERL~ING R.EJ.~OVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS TO 
PROVIDE SUCH REMOVAL UPON CONVICTION OF FELONY, INDICTABLE 
MISDEMEANOR OR ONE INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE: PROVIDE 
INITIATION THROUGH PRESENTATION OF SWORN ACCUSATION IN 
DISTRICT COURT BY ANY TAXPAYER ..... . 
THIRD READING HOUSE BILL No. 82 
TRANSCRIPT OF DEBATE 
REPRESENTATIVE FROST: .... Mr. Speaker, and fellow rep-
resentatives thank you for extending the courtesy of cir-
culating this bill for me. I would like to give you just a 
little bit of background on this bill. It came about through 
the incident here in Salt Lake County of Mr. Jones being con-
victed and being sent to prison while in office, and so I 
decided that probably there was something that needed to be 
done about the bill. I read in the paper where the governor 
and other officials said that the law was not clear on cases 
like this and that it should be cleared up, so I asked, first 
before the session started, I asked Mr. Lewis Lloyd from the 
Legislative Council to research this a little bit, I didn't 
ask him to prepare a bill, but I asked his opinion on it and he 
says yes, he concurred that the law needed to be cleared up and 
strengthened. When the session started he did have a bill 
prepared for me on this, I didn't ask him to do this but he did 
have a bill prepared. I took this prepared bill down to the 
reference attorneys and asked them to check it over and see if 
there was any improvement they could make on this bill, and 
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they took this first version and worked it over and came up 
with another bill which they printed. Then I went down to the 
Attorney General's office with it, and I also asked that the 
reference attorneys if they thought that this law should be 
strengthened and cleared up and they said yes, very 
definitely. Then I went to the Attorney General's office and 
worked oh about a week in the Attorney General's office and 
they also printed another bill for me. They had the opinion 
also that there should be a strengthening in this field, the 
law should be clarified and strengthened. And they printed 
a bill for me also. Now this bill as we have it here before 
us is the bill as prepared by the Attorney General's office. 
I then went reverse on the route back to these reference 
attorneys and Mr. Lloyd and had them recheck the bill over 
and they said that as far as they was concerned it was a good 
bill, and they couldn't find any flaws in it. We looked mainly 
at the fact, and checked very thoroughly, we didn't want to 
make a bill that was so harsh that public officials would be 
harassed continually by cranks who would want to remove them 
from office, but we also wanted to come up with a bill that was 
fair and when a person had performed any misconduct in office 
where he would come under this law that it was very definite 
and clear how he could be removed from office. And this is 
the bill as it is before you now, and I think that's all I need 
to say about it, and thank you. 
MR. SPEAKER: Are you ready for the question on House 
Bill 82? Representative Ludwig. 
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REPRESENTATIVE LUDWIG: I have a directed question to 
Representative Frost. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Frost, will you submit to 
questions? 
REPRESENTATIVE FROST: Yes. 
REPRESENTATIVE LUDWIG: On the ... this covers, of course, 
clearly anything below the State level ... would they be con-
sidered also ... included the offices of the State in this? 
REPRESENTATIVE FROST: Yes, the offices of the State are 
already covered under other sections of the Code. We dis-
cussed that quite thoroughly. 
REPRESENTATIVE LUDWIG: By impeachment or actually by 
this process, there are two different things involved here. 
REPRESENTATIVE FROST: Yes, uh, we went into that quite 
thoroughly, and I asked that from every one of these different 
agencies and they said yes that the State offices are already 
covered by this under this Code in a different section, and 
they are covered by it already. 
REPRESENTATIVE LUDWIG: Well they are covered by impeach-
ment proceedings brought only by certain people or are they 
covered by a citizen who would be required to the same as this 
act would do to minor political subdivisions? 
REPRESENTATIVE FROST: I don't know about a citizen taking 
action against a State official, if they are covered that way. 
That didn't come up in our questions. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Ludwig. 
REPRESENTATIVE LUDWIG: This bill provides that such 
accusations may be initiated by any taxpayer. What I am asking 
is can he do the same on the State level or is it my impeach-Sponsor d by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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ment proceedings say restricted to say for some of the State 
offices, would it be by impeachment by way of the Legislature 
or something else so that it is very limited. 
REPRESENTATIVE FROST: Well, uh, this act here would not 
apply to State officials. It states here City, County, or 
other political subdivisions of this State. As I understand 
it, it did not include the State officials. 
REPRESENTATIVE LUDWIG: Right, I understand that, but my 
question was can State officials be reached in a like manner 
by the other means which you discussed, or might it be wise 
to consider placing them under this also? 
REPRESENTATIVE FROST: I couldn't tell you. I was in-
formed that ... I did not research this phase of it, but we had 
quite a lot of discussion of this phase and I was informed 
that the Code was sufficient for State officials on this. 
MR. SPEAKER: REPRESE~TATIVE COX. 
REPRESENTATIVE COX: Would the Representative Frost sub-
mit to a question? 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Frost will you submit to a 
question? 
REPRESENTATIVE FROST: Yes. 
REPRESENTATIVE COX: Such accusation may be initiated by 
any taxpayer. Now I am wondering about that, does that mean 
that the bum that has brought a pack of cigarettes downtown and 
is arrested by the sheriff and taken to the jail because he was 
inebriated or was a vagrant, that he could come out of jail day 
after tomorrow and by making a sworn statement make that sheriff 
defend himself before the District Court, is that the meaning of 
this. 
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REPRESENTATIVE FROST: Representative Cox, in one 
interpretation, yes. But you know what I said before, 
that we did not make this harsh enough so that any little 
picky accusations like that they could commence accu-
sation for removal. They have to be convicted of a 
felony to begin with. These crimes are spelled out in 
the first paragraph very distinctly, and it is so worded 
that that is one thing that we wanted to get away from ... 
that some crank could not start procedures without any 
basis for this procedure. 
REPRESENTATIVE COX: I'll agree that if they are 
convicted it has to be of something serious, but is 
there anything to stop him from swearing to a statement 
and making him defend himself in Court. Not convict 
him, but just defend himself? 
REPRESENTATIVE FROST. The statute, as it now is, 
there is nothing now to stop the person from starting 
action against any official, but this spells out very 
clearly that before anything definitely can be taken 
care of or proceedings be started, that he would have 
to be proven or it would have to be shown beyond any 
reasonable doubt that he was guilty of some of these 
crimes. 
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